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Abstract
Many states in the Middle East claim to be waging determined war against ISIS. But no one, save the Kurds, seems 
to be doing so. Threatening as it is, ISIS is not the top priority of any member of the coalition arrayed against it. 
Regional responses to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, have varied depending on regime 
perceptions of threat, not only from ISIS itself, but also from other potential rivals, challengers, or enemies. Despite 
the jihadi group's extensive use of violence in Syria and Iraq and its claims of responsibility for bombings and 
attacks in Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen -- as well as France in mid-November 
-- it was not necessarily the top security priority for any of these states.
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 Regional perceptions and Syria, responses or of ISIS, threat, to have the not rise varied only of from the depending Islamic ISIS itself, State on but regime in Iraq also Regional and Syria, or ISIS, have varied depending on regime perceptions of threat, not only from ISIS it lf, but also
 from other potential rivals, challengers or enemies. Despite
 the jihadi groups extensive use of violence in Syria and Iraq
 and its claims of responsibility for bombings and attacks in
 Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and
 Yemen - as well as France in mid-November - it was not
 necessarily the top security priority for any of these states. And
 this level of priority, in part, explains the seemingly scattered,
 incoherent and decidedly disparate responses to ISIS, even
 as the organization expanded its territorial control in 2014
 and into the next year, before losing some ground in the later
 months of 2015.
 Within the discipline of international relations, ISIS gener-
 ally fits the mold of a non-state actor. It is a jihadi organization
 with affiliates in several countries, but which emerged from a
 marriage of previously opposed elements in Iraq - al-Qaeda in
 Iraq, on the one hand, and security and intelligence personnel
 from the toppled Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, on the
 other. But when ISIS declared itself a revived caliphate, and
 took control of Mosul and other cities, towns and territories, it
 started to look more like the state that it aspired to be. Those
 rapid conquests triggered considerable alarm across the region,
 for ISIS suddenly seemed like a contender for real power. Yet
 the bloody rise of ISIS was but the latest in a series of jolts to
 the regional system. And the timing of these events matters
 in understanding the regional responses.
 A Series of Jolts
 The ill-fated US invasion of Iraq in 2003 delivered a shock to the
 region, leading to a radical rise in terrorism, and reinvigorating
 al-Qaeda and its ilk. The unintended, yet all too predictable,
 effects of the US invasion did not end there, however. The
 destruction of Iraq also enabled the continuing rise to regional
 prominence and the greater foreign policy activism of the
 Islamic Republic of Iran, a state run largely by Shi'i Muslim
 clerics and whose rival states mostly identify with Sunni Islam.
 Irans ascent fed the existing narrative of many Sunni Islamist
 organizations, and especially jihadi ones, that the region was
 embroiled in a struggle for control and survival between the
 two main branches of Islam. Of the states in the region, Iran
 and Saudi Arabia have been particularly guilty of aiding and
 abetting this sectarian narrative, actively encouraging prejudice
 when it favors them, but also vocally decrying the other for
 sowing this same inter-communal distrust.
 In 2011, the region was shaken to its roots again. This time,
 the challenges came from below, in the form of the populist
 pro-democracy movements across the Arab world. After initial
 successes, however, and unfortunately for the regions many
 grassroots activists, reactionary forces subsequently came to
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 dominate and destabilize regional politics still further. The
 uprisings took a dark turn toward civil war, insurgency and
 resurgent authoritarianism, despite the efforts of millions of
 Arab citizens to the contrary. When ISIS emerged, ostensibly
 challenging all states in the region, it provided an excuse for
 already security-obsessed regimes to hunker down still more,
 further damaging the democratic goals of the movements
 of 2011. The regimes, in short, were already in the midst of
 reestablishing themselves.
 But ISIS also emerged at a moment in regional international
 relations that has been described as a new Middle East cold war,
 not in the sense of the global Cold War that ran roughly from
 1945 to 1990, but more akin to an earlier regional rift known as
 the Arab cold war. Like the current version, the earlier conflict
 saw authoritarian regimes wrestle with each other to remain in
 power and to dominate the internal affairs (and even regime
 types) of their neighbors. The earlier version, associated with
 Egyptian political ascendancy under Gamal Abdel Nasser in
 the 1950s and 1960s, coalesced around two struggles - one
 between nominally leftist military-backed republics and
 conservative hereditary monarchies, and a second among the
 radical republics themselves (often taking on Nasserist versus
 Baathist dimensions).
 Todays regional cold war has many similarities to the past.
 In both eras, an alignment of conservative monarchies banded
 together to fend off challenges to the rule of royal families. In
 both eras, the struggles took place within the weakest states,
 including in the form of military interventions and civil wars
 and backing alternative local contenders for power from
 Syria to Yemen. In the current version, however, there is no
 coalition of radical republics and no equivalent to the figure
 of Nasser, for that matter. The closest approximation might
 be the self-styled "axis of resistance" that links Iran and Asad s
 Syria to Lebanese Hizballah and (at least at one time) Hamas.
 But each of these actors is itself a polarizing force for much
 of the rest of the region. And also unlike the earlier era, this
 time there are multiple jihadi movements, from al-Qaeda to
 ISIS, challenging regimes, states and borders.
 The new version also includes a pronounced sectarian
 dimension. This fact should be seen not so much as a cause
 in itself, but rather as an element in regional identity politics
 that major powers - Saudi Arabia and Iran, in particular - have
 manipulated in order to rouse support for themselves and
 counter their opponents. Similarly, Islamist movements from
 the Society of Muslim Brothers on the Sunni side to Lebanese
 Hizballah on the Shi'i side have also in effect marketed their
 own material power struggles as ideological and existential.
 It is into this volatile mix that ISIS expanded, establishing a
 kind of anti-Westphalian state in parts of both Syria and Iraq.
 ISIS, Syria and Iraq
 As ISIS emerged, Syria's regime was immersed in war with
 rebel factions, but the civil war had already turned into
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 something of a multi-sided melee including outside proxies.
 In that sense, ISIS was but the latest entrant into a war that
 had enlisted foreign fighters, including Lebanese Hizballah
 and forces from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
 The brutal regime of Bashar al-Asad had survived the war
 mainly through extensive Iranian and Russian support, yet
 it seemed paradoxically to value - at least instrumentally
 ISIS emerged as Arab regimes
 were reconsolidating their power
 after the 2011 uprisings.
 and temporarily - the entry of ISIS and other jihadi orga-
 nizations into the fray. Asad's forces appeared to prefer
 attacks on elements of the Free Syrian Army, the set of
 armed organizations that comprised a diffuse rebel military
 front, even as ISIS, too, battled rebels it derided as tools of
 Western imperialism.
 The role of jihadi elements in the Syrian civil war - from
 Ahrar al-Sham to Jabhat al-Nusra to ISIS itself - also
 buttressed the dictatorship s overall narrative of a secular state
 defending itself and the notion of a pluralist Syria against
 violent and uncompromising Sunni Islamist chauvinism.
 When Asad originally claimed that the Syrian revolution was
 a foreign and jihadi conspiracy, it was utterly ludicrous. But
 as the war dragged on, jihadi elements loomed ever larger on
 the battlefield. And here, too, the very brutality of both the
 regime and ISIS each fed the others self-image as champion
 of the Syrian people against a particularly barbaric force. Both
 were indeed ruthless, but neither could reasonably be seen
 as defenders of public safety, let alone popular sovereignty
 or social welfare.
 In Iraq, unlike in Syria, the regime was no longer an
 avowed Baathist state. But the post-invasion Iraqi state
 remained under construction or reconstruction, and leaders
 like Nouri al-Maliki had proven to be both authoritarian and
 sectarian in their modes of operation. Maliki had jealously
 guarded his personal power for several years, but simulta-
 neously undermined the writ of the state, which became
 increasingly identified in Iraq as an amalgam of sectarian
 actors - the government and army included - rather than a
 set of national institutions. When in 2014 the army yielded
 town after town and city after city to advancing ISIS forces,
 it only reinforced perceptions of its frailty and partisan nature.
 Indeed, to date, the main military successes against ISIS in
 Iraq have been achieved by Kurdish peshmergas and/or Shi'i
 militias, the latter often with the direct backing of Iranian
 forces, which now operate relatively openly.
 It is the very weakness of the Syrian and Iraqi states vis-à-vis
 their respective "nations" that has made them vulnerable to
 the sectarian narrative emanating from embattled grassroots
 movements, but also from state capitals and the capital of an
 aspiring state, namely, Raqqa, the center of the ISIS "caliphate."
 In 2006 Jordans King Abdallah II referred to a "Shiite crescent"
 stretching from Lebanon across Syria and Iraq to its cusp in
 Iran. But, as political scientist F. Gregory Gause has argued, the
 real dynamic is not an arc of Shi'ism or of Iranian power, but
 rather an arc of weak states that are each prone to manipulation
 by other states. And at present, these states include regional
 powers that prefer to hide their own political agendas behind
 a veneer of sectarianism.
 As the Syrian uprising of 2011 turned into a protracted
 civil war, it was quite complex in real terms - yet like Iraq,
 the Syrian situation fit into the existing Saudi-Iranian power
 struggle and the narrative of sectarian conflict that both
 powers, and indeed many domestic Islamist movements,
 were already using. Iraq's "new" military frequently seemed
 to crumble in the face of the ISIS threat, yielding the field
 to Kurdish and Shi'i irregulars and Sunni tribes to fight
 sometimes against ISIS, sometimes against others, but always
 over the future of the Iraqi state itself.
 Responses of Regional Powers
 The Syrian civil war seemed to drag in a host of foreign
 powers, most of whom decried external meddling, even as
 they attempted to intervene covertly or otherwise to affect
 the outcome of the war. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran seemed
 to regard the Syrian war as vital to their own struggle, and
 backed opposing sides, helping to lead to a relentlessly bloody
 stalemate. They would reproduce this same disastrous formula
 as they backed rival Yemeni groups, helping to plunge Yemen,
 too, into civil war in late 2014. This calculus only makes sense
 in the context of cold war dynamics - that is, fomenting insta-
 bility and violence elsewhere in order to preserve power and
 regime security and survival at home. Yet here, too, security
 priorities differed. Iran appeared to give pride of place to the
 war in Syria, with only limited support for the Houthi rebels
 in Yemen, while a new Saudi regime seemed almost to have
 panicked, reading in Yemen a far greater role for the Islamic
 Republic, and hence leading a military intervention that far
 surpasses what Iran has done.
 The focus of Riyadh and Tehran on one another explains
 at least in part the confused and delayed responses to
 ISIS. For Iran, the territorial conquests of ISIS took place
 in largely Sunni Arab or Kurdish parts of Syria and Iraq,
 but in all cases they interfered in Iran's self-styled sphere
 of influence. While the situations in Syria and Iraq were
 dramatically different, Iran put forces on the ground in
 both countries to support the regimes against domestic
 opponents and now also to counter ISIS. Saudi Arabia, in
 contrast, did not send its own troops into combat and had
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 Syrians seek refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan, September 17, 2014.  ANDREA BRUCE/NOOR/REDUX
 no equivalent ally to Hizballah to back in its stead. It did,
 however, support various Syrian rebel factions, funnel arms
 and money into the conflict, and continue to cast Iran - not
 ISIS - as its main regional opponent. In the aftermath
 of the Iranian nuclear deal (between Iran and six major
 powers, including the US), and the Russian airstrikes that
 commenced in September, that orientation has intensified.
 Saudi Arabia remains the wealthiest Arab state, but the
 largest Arab army belongs to Egypt. Would that army be
 part of an anti-ISIS coalition? No, for Egypt is no longer the
 regional power it once was, and its focus remains decidedly
 internal rather than regional.
 In Egypt, regime change did mean foreign policy change.
 The government of President Muhammad Mursi, of the
 Muslim Brothers, had difficult relations with Saudi Arabia,
 the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, but established a close
 alignment with both Qatar and the Islamist government
 of President Recep Tayyip Erdoģan in Turkey. After the
 2013 military coup, and the rise of the regime of President
 Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, Egyptian foreign relations changed
 dramatically, leading to immediate estrangement from Qatar
 and Turkey, and an equally immediate new alignment with
 Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE - with the latter two
 allies providing the new regime with considerable largesse.
 While vehemently anti-Islamist, and viewing almost all
 policies through a counter-terrorism lens, the Sisi regime
 no etheless seemed to put crushing the Muslim Brothers
 far bove any concern with ISIS. Even as more militant
 Isla ist movements, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, emerged
 to challenge the regime for control of Sinai, the regime
 continued to insist that the Brothers were the real enemy,
 intimating that it was the Brothers who were really behind
 various attacks, even those claimed by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
 or ISIS. When ISIS militants murdered Egyptian Copts in
 Libya, the state did respond with airstrikes. But the focus
 on the Brothers remained.
 Beyond the Arab states, the major non-Arab regional
 powers - Israel, Iran and Turkey - each took very different
 approaches to the challenge of ISIS. Israel remained largely
 neutral, in the sense of not being a direct participant, but
 not in the sense of being a disinterested party. Israeli security
 officials were focused on the Syrian war, and had launched
 airstrikes within Syria against alleged Hizballah targets,
 but ot yet against ISIS. But for the Israeli government,
 all ou comes were negative: Any ISIS or even alternative
 Islamist regime was likely to be hostile, and hence appeared
 perhaps less threatening than the survival of an embattled
 Baathist regime. In contrast, Iran comprised part of the forces
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 confronting ISIS directly, in an often odd and uncoordi-
 nated de facto coalition with the United States and several
 European powers, while Turkish policy seemed to be in a bit
 of a muddle. In the early days of the Arab uprisings, Turkeys
 government had seemed triumphant. As Islamist regimes
 emerged in Tunis and Cairo, Erdoģan even participated as
 an honored guest in meetings of the Arab League - a highly
 unusual circumstance for a Turkish leader. Yet in short order,
 old feelings of mistrust reasserted themselves. The Islamist
 moment seemed short-lived, after all, as Ennahda suffered
 electoral setbacks in Tunisia while the Muslim Brothers were
 ousted in Egypt and later banned there, as in Saudi Arabia
 and the UAE.
 As the Syrian civil war deepened, Turkey opposed Asad,
 supporting rebel movements, but refusing to directly inter-
 vene. While the state steadfastly denied it, countless reports
 charged Turkey with arming key factions, including jihadi
 elements like Jabhat al-Nusra, while also allowing Islamist
 fighters ^to cross its borders to join the Syrian opposition.
 But Turkish policy was, as always, complicated also by the
 Kurdish question. Local Kurds battled ISIS over the city
 of Kobane, but Turkey was accused both of facilitating and
 preventing the flow of Kurdish forces to the front lines
 against ISIS. After suffering an electoral setback of their
 own in the summer, Turkish officials began reassessing their
 approach to the entire ISIS question. When ISIS began
 bombing Turkish border towns, the policy seemed to shift,
 with Turkey now more explicitly against ISIS, and being
 pressured by allies to cross the border to at least create some
 kind of "safe zone" for refugees and perhaps to intervene
 even more directly. Turkeys response, however, only under-
 scored the differing priorities of regional regimes, since
 Erdoģan's government spoke in terms of combating ISIS,
 while directing most Turkish military attacks at Kurdish
 forces and especially at the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or
 PKK. Similarly, when Russia intervened even more directly
 in the Syrian war, with extensive airstrikes, it too claimed
 to be bombarding ISIS, while unleashing most of its muni-
 tions against US-backed rebels fighting the Russian-allied
 Asad regime.
 Next in Line?
 To the south of Syria, Jordan faced similar pressures to those
 of Turkey - including the idea of potentially advancing across
 the border to create some kind of security zone in southern
 Syria. Like Turkey and Lebanon, Jordan hosted hundreds of
 thousands of Syrian refugees. Indeed, it was not the regional
 powers, but the geographically proximate and decidedly
 weaker states - Lebanon and Jordan - that seemed to grasp
 the urgency of the ISIS threat. Both states saw nationals
 captured or kidnapped and ultimately murdered by ISIS,
 but neither was in a position to counter ISIS on its own.
 Both states claimed to have absorbed more than a million
 Syrian refugees each, and were politically, economically and
 militarily vulnerable, even as they had both managed to avoid
 the revolutionary impulses of 2011.
 It was only after the murder of American hostages that
 the US began a campaign of military strikes against ISIS,
 first in Iraq and later in Syria as well. Jordan, a close ally of
 the US, agreed to join in the airstrikes. King Abdallah II
 insisted that the fight against ISIS was vital to Jordan and
 to the region, and that it was not at all akin to the deeply
 Russian airstrikes in Syria have
 deepened the existing impasse.
 unpopular US war in Iraq that began in 2003. And indeed
 for Jordan, bordering both Syria and Iraq, the fight was
 urgent indeed. But while most Jordanians were opposed to
 ISIS, they differed over whether Jordan should play a direct
 military role against the group. That debate swung wildly
 when a Jordanian fighter pilot - Muadh al-Kassasba, was
 shot down over ISIS-held territory. Jordan suspended its
 role in airstrikes as it negotiated for the pilots release from
 captivity, only to find out that ISIS had burned Kassasba
 alive weeks earlier. A gruesome video documenting the
 killing was released, leading Jordan, in response, to execute
 several high-profile convicted jihadi bombers in its own
 prisons, and then engage in a renewed series of airstrikes
 on ISIS targets. Within Jordan, the overwhelming public
 response was horror at the ghastly ISIS acts. But many
 voices - albeit quietly - still questioned whether Jordan
 should be engaged militarily at all.
 Even as the Jordanian state attempted to take a lead
 in forming an Arab coalition against ISIS, with Western
 backing, many Jordanian officials were frustrated by their
 own allies' differing views regarding preeminent threats.
 Saudi Arabia seemed still focused on Iran above all. Qatar
 remained supportive of Muslim Brother movements, but
 worried about Iran, even as Egypt and the UAE appeared
 to see the Brothers, not Iran or ISIS, as the main strategic
 danger. Indeed, in another major shift in regional interna-
 tional relations, no Arab state seemed to identify Israel as
 the top anxiety. As alignments continued to shift in response
 to domestic and regional insecurities, the Israeli and Saudi
 governments continued to sound ever more similar in
 their critiques of their US ally and even more so in their
 near obsession with Iran as the primary enemy, with ISIS
 decidedly secondary.
 When ISIS bombed mosques in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
 and Yemen, or slaughtered tourists on the beaches of Tunisia,
 regional regimes were compelled to confront ISIS as a serious
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 threat. But another question remained: Which ISIS? Multiple
 branches of the group had popped up, as with al-Qaeda before.
 For each regime, fears were partly internal - to what extent
 did ISIS have a following inside a particular country's borders?
 Tunisia, for example, has often been said to supply more ISIS
 recruits than any other Arab country.
 The Jordanians, however, attempted to rally regional support
 for a campaign against what remained "ISIS central" - the
 Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. At the Arab League summit
 in March in Egypt, the regimes acknowledged that militant
 Islamismi and jihadi extremism were their greatest and most
 immediate challenges. They even agreed, in principle, to
 form a pan-Arab military coalition. The Joint Arab Force was
 supposed to comprise at least 40,000 troops, to be drawn
 mainly from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Gulf Cooperation
 Council countries. These were to include land, air and naval
 contingents in a kind of rapid reaction force. But the Arab
 League has long been a forum whose solemn communiqués
 and bluster produce little action, and is hardly a real alliance,
 or a military coalition. Even when Saudi Arabia did manage
 to assemble a military coalition of Arab states, it was deployed
 to Yemen, not against ISIS.
 In addition to lagging in meaningful military cooperation,
 the regimes tellingly differed in regards to what they meant by
 extremism or militancy. Regimes individually decried groups
 and states varying from the Muslim Brothers to al-Qaeda to
 ISIS to Iran. Regime opponents and critics in some of these
 same states pointed to the authoritarian brutality of many
 of the regimes themselves as the main security threat to the
 peoples of the region, and one that enabled violent challengers
 like ISIS to emerge in the first place.
 As ISIS, meanwhile, continued to rule swathes of Iraq and
 Syria while urging and sponsoring attacks across the region
 and beyond, it remained striking that unlike every regional
 power before it, this one had no regional or global backer
 (despite countless conspiracy theories to the contrary). At face
 value, ISIS had alienated almost every state in the region and
 every global power. One would think that would lead to a
 countervailing coalition that would make short work of ISIS.
 Yet each regime remained focused on different domestic and
 external security concerns. ISIS had appeared in part because
 of state failure. Further expansion would depend on ISIS being
 able to visit that formula on other places. It was for that reason
 that the governments and publics in both Lebanon and Jordan
 remained deeply concerned that regional and global allies had,
 thus far, proved unwilling or incapable of countering ISIS,
 while they themselves could not do so alone, but also feared
 that they were next in line. In November 2015, ISIS suicide
 bombers struck Baghdad, Beirut and Paris, with devastating
 effects. Countries in the region and well beyond - including
 the United States, Russia, France and other European states -
 spoke of the urgent need finally to unite against ISIS. But, in
 order to do so, they would have to overcome their considerable
 differences in security priorities and more. ■
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